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ABSTRACT
An extensive micro data set matching firms, establishments and their employees, 
is used to study the determinants of earnings inequality in Portugal and its 
evolution from 1983 to 1992, with the Theil index, its decomposition, and the 
decomposition of its change as tools of analysis. The relevance of both worker 
and employer attributes in shaping earnings inequality and its trend is quantified. 
The impact of the firm on wage inequality in a European country is compared to 
the situation in the USA, where a different institutional framework is often 
believed to grant firms more autonomy in wage setting. The impact of the firm is 
indeed slightly lower in Portugal than in the USA, suggesting that a more 
centralised and regulated European bargaining system might reduce the scope for 
firm action. A profile of an economy undergoing modernisation, where rising 
labour market inequality signalled the lack of an adequate labour force, can be 
drawn. An upgrading of the quality of the labour force, accompanied by rising 
returns to skill and schooling and declining returns to age is detected, while firms 
shifted towards more flexible structures.
Key-words: wage structure; inequality decomposition; Portugal; firm.
JEL: J31, J51, D21.
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Evidence on growing wage inequality within industrialised economies began 
to be reported in the empirical literature in the 1980s, contradicting previous 
evidence and challenging economic theory. There is now wide consensus over the 
idea that this trend was widespread, having hit economies with contrasting wage 
setting institutions. As in most other OECD countries, rising inequality 
characterised the evolution of labour returns in Portugal (see OECD [1993]). 
Moreover, inequality in the Portuguese labour market increased very sharply, 
from the already high values of early 1980s. Indeed, the Gini index of hourly 
wages increased by 16%, from 0.32 to 0.38 between 1983 and 1992, while the 
coefficient of variation reported a more pronounced change of 26%, as the wage 
distribution reinforced one of its characteristics of the beginning of the decade -  a 
very stretched upper half (see CARDOSO [1996]).
This study looks at both worker and employer attributes as sources of wage 
dispersion and of its rising trend in Portugal during the 1980s and early 1990s, a 
period initially marked by an economic crisis, and after 1985 characterised by 
high economic growth, low unemployment and rising activity rate. Three main 
reasons contribute to the relevance of this topic, and each will be dealt with 
separately.
Studies of earnings inequality have concentrated mainly on worker attributes, 
encouraged by an economic theory dominated by the human capital approach and 
by the development of household surveys providing detailed data on household 
attributes and rewards. The growing awareness of the fact that labour economists 
have disregarded the demand side of the market (see namely h a m e r m e sh  [1993] 
and FREEMAN [1989]) led to the study of the role of the firm in wage inequality 
(see g r o sh e n  [1986] and d a v is  and h a l t iw a n g e r  [1991]), having been detected 
that inequality among firms accounts for a major share of the wage dispersion. 
Bringing together worker and employer attributes in a study of the determinants 
of earnings inequality thus seems a fruitful line of research.
However, most of the work quantifying the impact of the firm on earnings 
inequality has dealt with the USA, a labour market characterised by institutional 
arrangements quite different from those prevailing in Europe, where firms are 
thought to be granted less autonomy when bargaining over wages. In fact, the 
decentralised bargaining mechanisms, the low safety net and the traditionally 
lower unionisation rates characterising the deregulated and flexible American 
labour market contrast with the more centralised bargaining system and the 
relatively higher minimum wage levels enforced in Europe and its traditionally 
higher unionisation rates. "I found it inconceivable that European style national 
collective bargaining or extension of labor contracts from some employers to their 



























































































environment." [FREEMAN, 1995: 11] In particular this practice of extension of 
contracts is thought to have a major direct impact on the role of the firm in wage 
inequality -  "[introduction of] [e]extension of contracts [in the USA] would reduce 
wage inequality among firms." [FREEMAN, 1995: 14] To the extent that Portugal 
shares with its European counterparts their framework of industrial labour 
relations, namely the contract extension mechanism, analysis of the country can 
provide evidence on the relevance of the firm in shaping wage inequality under an 
institutional setting that diverges from that of the USA.
A particularly appropriate data set for the study of this issue is available for 
Portugal, which matches data on the firm, the establishment, and each of the 
workers. This extensive data set is gathered annually by the Portuguese Ministry 
of Employment and Social Security (MESS), based on a questionnaire that every 
establishment with wage earners has, since 1982, been legally obliged to fill in. 
Reported data cover the establishment itself (its location, economic activity and 
employment), the firm (location, economic activity, employment, sales, 
ownership structure), and furthermore each of the workers (gender, age, skill, 
occupation, schooling, tenure, earnings -  split into base-wage, tenure-related 
subsidies, other regular subsidies, irregular subsidies and overtime pay - , duration 
of work -  normal and overtime - ,  as well as the mechanism of collective 
bargaining). Appendix A provides more detailed information on the data set and 
the sampling procedure used.
Section 2 discusses the degree of centralisation in the Portuguese collective 
bargaining system and the constraints imposed on the firm wage setting behaviour 
by the minimum wage legislation. Sections 3 and 4 explain the methodology 
followed and the results obtained. In particular, they justify the choice of the 
Theil index and its decomposition as tools of analysis. Presentation of the results 
distinguishes between the determinants of inequality and of its trend, with a wide 
range of possible causes evaluated in a systematic way -  shifts in the employment 
structure, relative changes in the wage of different groups of workers, and 
changes in inequality within those groups, defined according to either worker or 
firm attributes. Concluding remarks are presented in section 5.
2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING IN THE PORTUGUESE LABOUR MARKET: 
CENTRALISATION VS. DECENTRALISATION
Collective bargaining
Features of a centralised wage bargaining system can be found in the 
Portuguese industrial labour relations system as in several other European 
countries, in contrast with the American model. Indeed, trade union 




























































































level to set each year a guideline for wage increases. Also, massive wage 
bargaining contracts predominate in the economy, in the sense that one or several 
employers' associations are involved, subscribing together to an agreement that 
often applies to an entire economic activity (see the impact of collective 
bargaining contracts in table 1). Compulsive extension mechanisms are another 
feature shared by Portugal and many European economies, as the Government 
can apply a mandatory regime, extending the application of existing documents 
(or in other instances enforcing a contract with an original contents), when 
workers are not covered by trade unions, when one of the parties refuses to 
negotiate, or bargaining is obstructed in any other way (see mandatory regime in 
table 1). Voluntary extensions are also found, when one economic partner -  
workers' representative or employer -  decides to subscribe to an agreement 
which it had initially not signed. Also in contrast to the American practice is the 
fact that employers who sign an agreement with a trade union(s) usually extend 
its application to all of their workforce, irrespective of the worker's union 
membership status. As such, the impact of collective bargaining goes far beyond 
union membership and the distinction between unionised and non-unionised 
workers (or firms) becomes meaningless.
Table 1 -  Share of the wage-earners covered by each type of collective bargaining 
mechanism, 1992
(%)
m assive w age  setting m echanism s decentralised w age setting  












82.9 4.5 4.0 7.3 1.3 100
Source: Portugal, MESS [1993a],
Nonetheless, certain aspects of decentralisation can also be highlighted, 
clearly setting this system apart from the very centralised ones, among which 
Sweden has deserved most attention in the literature. Employers may choose to 
negotiate individually with trade union(s) (yielding firm agreements, when one 
single employer is involved, or collective bargaining agreements, when several 
employers, though not organised into a formal association, are involved) (see 
decentralised wage setting mechanisms in table 1). Furthermore, freedom of union 
creation and union affiliation are recognised in the legal system and have resulted 
in a fragmented union structure, where overlapping unions often coexist, to a 
great extent competing and to a lesser extent cooperating. As the parties involved 
in collective bargaining may choose the level of negotiation (regional, 
occupational, industrial or national) and several unions can enter negotiation for 




























































































extents, the system can become extremely diffuse, with negotiation fragmented 
and agreements multiplied.
Further contributing to some flexibility in the system is the fact that wages 
actually paid by the firms often drift from their contractual levels, especially in 
periods of unexpected high inflation or changing economic conditions. Most 
agreements in fact address specifically the issue of the base monthly wage, the 
normal duration of work and overtime pay. Wage drift has been gradually 
increasing in the Portuguese economy during the 1980s (see a pe r t a  et. al. 
[1994]).
Minimum wage
A safety net for low wage workers is provided by the minimum wage, which 
in 1983 represented a stringent 55% of the economy's average wage, having 
declined to 47% by 1992.'
Table 2 -  Minimum wage (1)
WAGE LEVEL || 1983 1986 1989 1992
min w age /  av. m onthly earnings (% ) 1 55.0 56.1 50.6 46.5
WAGE GROWTH average annual growth rate ( % )
1983-86 1986-89 1989-92
real minim um  w age 0.1 -0.4 2.5
average real m onthly earnings -0.5 3.1 5.4
consum er price index 19.9 10.5 11.2
Sources: CPI -  computations based on Banco de Portugal, Relatorio do Conselho de 
Administraçâo, 1992, 1990. 1988.
Wages -  MESS, Quadros de Pessoal, 1983, 1986, 1989, 1992.
Minimum wages -  regulations enforced in each of the years.
Notes: (1) Minimum wage of activities other than domestic work and agriculture.
(2) Av. real earnings = aVerage n0mina' eamingS (lndeX baSe 1983) (BFT [1980: 243-254] 
v h  CPI (index base 1983) v 1
summarises this widely used procedure).
A certain space for firm manoeuvre was nonetheless allowed during most of 
the period under analysis. While nowadays minimum wage reductions apply only 
to youngsters below the age of 18, trainees aged 25 or less and handicapped 
workers, small firms were until recently allowed to pay wages below the 
minimum set for their activity1 2 -  if they employed fewer than 6 workers (a 
possibility revoked in 1991) or, on request, if they employed fewer than 50 
workers (a benchmark gradually lowered until it was revoked, in 1990).
1 The minimum wage for activities other than domestic work and agriculture was considered.
The economy's average wage computed from Quadros de Pessoal does not include 
agriculture and Public Administration (see appendix A on the data set).




























































































International comparisons suggest that inequality in the Portuguese labour 
market reaches a high value, similar to that of the United Kingdom; that is, 
slightly lower than the USA, which is usually taken as the paradigm of an unequal 
labour market, but higher than other countries most often included in comparative 
studies (the Gini coefficient for monthly earnings was in 1983 equal to 0.295, 
while the 90/10 wage ratio was 3.17) (see CARDOSO [1996]). The first question to 
be answered is therefore: What determines earnings inequality in Portugal?
The inequality measure to be used should be additively decomposable, to 
enable the detection of the contribution of different variables to overall earnings 
dispersion, yielding some insight into the causes of earnings differentials. This 
property, together with that of scale invariance and computational burden 
considerations, generates a certain consensus in the literature regarding the most 
appropriate measures to be used -  the entropy family, to which the Theil index 
belongs (see namely s h o r r o c k s  [1984: 1383], b o u r g u ig n o n  [1979: 901] or 
COWELL [1985: 201]). While beginning by the more common procedure of 
inequality decomposition, which considers the gross contribution of the 
variable(s) to total inequality, the analysis proceeds to use Cowell's proposal to 
compute marginal contributions of firm and worker attributes to total inequality 
(see COWELL [1985]), in a procedure less often found in the empirical literature.
Taking i to be an income3 receiver in a population of N  individuals, yl to be
N
the share of income he/she earns, such that y, a 0 and = 1, the Theil index
/-I
can be computed as
T(y) = 2y ,  log(NyJ  . ( 1)
i= l
The measure ranges between 0 (maximum equality) and log N  (maximum 
inequality).
Consider now the following notation for inequality decomposition:
-  y,, i=l ... At- income share earned by individual i;
-  Sg, g -1  ... G -  mutually exclusive and exhaustive population subgroups, 
defined according to some selected attribute(s);
c
-  Ng, g=l ...G -  size of each subgroup, with ^ N g = At;
*->
3. WHAT REASONS FOR INEQUALITY? WORKER VS. FIRM ATTRIBUTES
3 The word income will be used when talking about the Theil index, even though the analysis 
deals with earnings, because the language is somewhat easier and more immediately 




























































































yi , g=l...G -  share of income earned by the individuals in subgroup g;
c
It can be proven (see T H E IL  [1967:93-96]) that:
(2)
TB G
T W = \ Y-TW .
g - l
TB captures the inequality between the different G groups defined, as it considers 
the income per capita of each group. It can be interpreted as the degree of 
inequality that would exist if the selected attribute(s) were the only determinants 
of inequality, i.e., if everyone earned the mean income of his/her group and all the 
inequality within the groups had thus vanished [t h e i l , 1967: 95] [ t h e i l , 1972: 
101]. TWg expresses the inequality that exists within a certain group g. Notice 
that yj/Yg is the share of income of individual i in his/her group, whereas 1/Ng 
expresses his/her weight in the group. Yg are the weights used to compute overall 
within-groups inequality, TW. Following the reasoning used to interpret TB, TW 
is that share of the earnings dispersion not explained. Indeed, if every attribute 
determining inequality had been considered, then each group would be made up 
of homogeneous individuals, and inequality within each of the groups would have 
vanished.
Decomposition of hourly earnings4 inequality in the Portuguese labour market 
yields the results reproduced in table 3.






































































































































































































Source: Computations based on MESS, Quadros de Pessoal, 1992.
Note: See appendix C for the definition of the groups defined by each variable.
Considering each variable separately, innate worker attributes seem to have 
little relevance in shaping earnings inequality. In fact, gender accounts only for 
4% of inequality, while a much more detailed partition of the workforce, 
according to age, is associated with only 13% of total wage dispersion; a major 
share of inequality thus remains within the groups defined by each of these 
variables. On the contrary, worker choices5 concerning the career to follow and 
the investment in human capital are more relevant determinants of earnings 
inequality -  the schooling level, the skill and the occupation account for 27%, 
35% and 49% of inequality, respectively.6
Gross contributions to inequality suggest that the demand side imposes strict 
constraints on wages. Indeed, wage inequality among firms accounts for 62% of 
total inequality. The fact that the contribution of the establishment is 65% 
indicates that it adds little to the explanation of inequality, confirming the idea
5 Whether constrained or not, a point which is beyond this discussion.
6 One should however keep in mind that such population partitions differ widely in their 
fineness -  whereas the variable gender defines two groups, schooling defines five, skill eight, 
and the occupation defines 1207 groups (see appendix C). The latter, much more detailed 
partition, is likely to capture a higher share of total inequality. Also, such a detailed 





























































































that wage bargaining decisions are mainly taken at the firm level. Considering just 
the manufacturing sector, the contribution of the establishment to overall 
inequality reaches 48%, a result slightly lower than that detected by DAVIS and 
HALTIWANGER [1991:133-135], who reported a 51% to 58% contribution of the 
establishment to total earnings inequality in manufacturing in the USA. Such 
values provide preliminary evidence suggesting that firms may be allowed more 
freedom when setting wages in the USA than in Portugal. The economic activity of 
the firm and its size stand out as the attributes most closely associated with 
inequality. The ownership structure, the location (in a country known to be 
characterised by sharp regional contrasts) and the institutional setting have 
similar impacts on inequality -  16% to 17%.
The analysis should progress to quantify marginal contributions to inequality. 
Whereas TBIT evaluates the impact on inequality due to the attribute selected to 
define the groups, it disregards the interactions that might exist with other 
variables, reporting gross contributions to inequality. In fact, if we take j  and k to 
be two variables chosen to partition the population, the conditions T = TB] + TW] 
and T = TBk + TWk hold, but most often the joint contribution of both variables is 
not equal to the sum of their individual contributions. Instead,
TBjk = TBj + TBk +1jk , (3)
where Ijk stands for the interaction existing between the variables j  and k, which, 
unless the variables were perfectly independent, can be positive or negative. The 
impact of variable k, controlling for variable j, can be computed as [COWELL, 
1985]:
Cj = TBjk -  TBj = TBk + Ijk P (4)
The decomposition given by equation 2, together with equation 3, enable us to 
write
T = TBjk + TWjk = TBJ + TBk + Ijk + TWjk. (5)
Also, it follows from equation 4 that
TBk = C‘k - 1jk . (6)
Plugging this result and its equivalent for variable j  into equation 5 and 
simplifying yields
T = C*+C { - I lk + TWjk. (7)
Particularly interesting is that decomposition which highlights the impact on 
inequality exclusively due to the firm, plus that exclusive to the worker 7




























































































characteristics, plus the interaction between the firm and the type of worker. Total 
inequality in the Portuguese labour market was thus decomposed into:
T = Cw+Cf - 1 ^  + TWnf
<& .28379 = 10411 + .03351 + .14351 + .00266
(100%) (36.7%) (11.8%) (50.6%) (0.9%)
where w stands for all the worker attributes taken jointly (skill, schooling, 
occupation, sex, age, tenure), /  stands for firm, C evaluates the marginal 
contribution of each of these two factors, controlling for the other one, and /  is the 
interaction between the firm and type of worker. The percentage contribution of 
each term is highlighted.
A very fine partition of the population was implemented -  each group is 
defined simultaneously by the firm in which the worker is engaged, his/her 
gender, age, tenure, skill, schooling level and occupation. With such finely 
defined groups, we would expect to have captured most sources of wage 
dispersion, and in fact less than 1% of total inequality remains unexplained, in the 
sense that it remains within these homogeneous groups. Once the impact of the 
firm is controlled for, the contribution of all the worker attributes reported in the 
first panel of table 2 is 37% of total inequality. Economy-wide, human-capital 
type of variables account for over one third of total inequality and thus human 
capital explanations of earnings differentials can by no means be dismissed. The 
contribution exclusive to the firm (firm-wide impact on wages) is 12% of total 
inequality. Comparison with the results of the second panel in table 2 reveals that 
a strong (negative) interaction between the firm and types of workers had been 
disregarded. The interaction term accounts for half of the existing inequality, 
stressing the impact of the different pay and recruitment policies across firms. 
Two different mechanisms may be embodied in the interaction term, a 
recruitment policy mechanism and a pay system mechanism -  good firms recruit 
good workers, who are thus granted an extra-premium for their attributes 
(reinforcing the inequality that would be exclusively due to the firm plus that 
exclusively due to worker attributes); on the other hand, some types of workers 
may get an extra premium in some types of firms, stressing the relevance of 
differences in internal labour markets across firms. Empirical studies relying on 
the decomposition of the Theil index have stressed the first type of interpretation 





























































































Table 4 -  Interactions between the firm and each worker attribute, 1992
interactions between the firm and
occupation skill school sex tenure age
value -.0767 -.0492 -.0452 -.0035 .0074 .0138
share of total inequality (%) 27.0 17.3 15.9 1.2 2.9 4.9
Source: Computations based on MESS. Quadros de Pessoal, 1992.
Negative values for the interaction between variables j  and k reveal that the 
inequality exclusively due to attribute j, plus that exclusively due to attribute k is 
reinforced once we take both attributes into account (see equation 7), meaning 
that high wage j's are associated with high wage k's\ positive interactions, 
instead, mean that the combination of both variables lowers the inequality that 
would be given by summing their marginal contributions. Looking at the 
interactions between the firm and each worker attribute separately, one can 
conclude that the match between (high wage) firms and (high wage) occupations 
is particularly pronounced, accounting for 27% of inequality, which could lend 
support to the idea that such a detailed occupational classification is likely to 
capture firm characteristics, and not just worker attributes. Sorting mechanisms 
also operate with respect to skill and schooling levels and, to a lesser extent, with 
gender. The opposite happens with age and tenure, with a positive interaction 
indicating that different age and tenure levels coexist within the firm.
Data for further international comparisons are available if the relevance of the 
employer is evaluated as its impact on inequality after controlling for the 
economic activity. Within each Portuguese manufacturing industry defined at the 
2-digit level8, the establishment still accounts for 31% of total inequality, 
compared to 40% to 46% detected by d a v is  and h a l t iw a n g e r  [1991: 134-135] 
in the USA. The impact o f  the establishment (all activities) on inequality becomes 
6% once we control for the 2-digit industry and all the worker characteristics, as 
compared to 7.9% detected by GROSHEN [ 1986:70].9
Evidence on Portugal therefore lends support to the idea that firms have more 
autonomy in wage setting in the USA, a labour market characterised by a high 
degree of decentralisation, than in a more regulated and centralised European 
bargaining system. However, the results are not as far apart as the existence of 
features such as the mechanism of extension of contracts in Europe, and its 
absence in the USA, would let us foresee. The European diversity should be 
acknowledged, to highlight certain aspects of decentralisation in wage setting
8 To obtain a number of industries comparable to that used by other studies.
9 Even though the controls used by Groshen are not strictly comparable to the ones used here. 
In fact, she controlled for the industry, the detailed occupation of the worker, the sex and the 
pay system. Both studies control for the industry, but while this study explicitly controls for 
several worker attributes, Groshen used the detailed occupation and the sex as proxies for 
such characteristics; her study, on the other hand, controls for the pay system, on which no 




























































































which are, in some cases, common to several European countries, while in other 
cases they are specific to Portugal, a labour market with an intermediate degree of 
centralisation.
Guidelines set centrally by representatives of the economic partners provide a 
merely indicative benchmark for wage bargaining and moreover they relate only 
to wage increases and not wage levels. Also, collective bargaining is fragmented, 
as overlapping unions often coexist and agreements are multiplied with employers 
having the choice to negotiate individually with trade unions. The considerable 
impact of wage drift on the wages actually paid is also common to most European 
country experiences.
Portugal presents other features that are not common to the European model. 
While minimum wage legislation is enforced, during most of the period under 
analysis it was a flexible benchmark, that firms could to some extent overcome. 
Regarding vocational training, the links between the educational system and the 
labour market are traditionally weak, reflected namely in the low share of blue- 
collars holding a technical diploma -  20% in Portugal as opposed to 90% in 
Germany (according to RODRIGUES and LOPES [1993: 17]) which may 
contribute to grant firms a certain discretionary power when setting wages, as 
external constraints (e.g. a diploma) are weak.
Though the Portuguese case may illustrate that a pattern is at work -  a slightly 
lower impact of the firm on wage inequality in Europe than in the USA - , the 
European diversity should not be disregarded. Indeed, to cite a few examples, the 
degree of centralisation of the bargaining system varies widely (see the extreme 
case of Sweden), the links between the educational system and the labour world 
differ (see the extreme situation of Germany) and the minimum wage achieves 
contrasting levels in the different countries, covering different shares of the 
workforce.
4. WHAT REASONS FOR RISING EARNINGS INEQUALITY?
The sharp rise in wage inequality in Portugal was particularly marked after 
1986 (see CARDOSO [1996]), when the economy began to recover and real wages 
were rising (see table 2). Declining real wages were associated with a slight 
increase in inequality, whereas the benefits of rising real wages were more 
unequally distributed. What drove this rise in labour market inequality?
A clear chronological pattern emerges from the analysis of the contribution of 
each variable to overall earnings inequality (see figure 1). Whereas until the mid- 
'eighties the available worker and firm attributes were responsible for the overall 
rise in inequality, the 'nineties witnessed the emergence of a new pattern -  in 




























































































groups of workers took the lead in shaping the evolution of aggregate inequality. 
Indeed, from 1989 to '92, all the variables except schooling and the bargaining 
mechanism reduced their contribution to total inequality. But let us look at each 
variable in more detail.
The decline in the relevance of innate worker characteristics -  sex and age -  
was foreseeable in the early 'eighties, as these were the only two variables whose 
contribution to total inequality showed signs of a decline between 1983 and 1986. 
After 1986, the relevance of employers' attributes as sources of wage dispersion 
began to decline -  its economic activity, size, location, type of ownership, as well 
as the firm and the establishments themselves - , decreased their contribution to 
total inequality. The workers' occupation followed a similar pattern. After 1989 
this trend was widespread, affecting all the variables, with two notable 
exceptions, the schooling level and the institutional setting represented by the 
type of bargaining mechanism.As a result, from 1983 to 1992, only a few 
variables managed to increase their importance as sources of wage dispersion -  
the skill and schooling levels of the workers, the location of the firm and the type 




























































































Figure 1 -  Contribution of worker and employer attributes to earnings inequality 
(TB/T)
Worker attributes
...............s k i l l ------------ occup -------------- school
------1- — age - - -£ t - -tenure — O —  gender
Employer and employer attributes
■ ------------------ firm
■ -O — location •
  - estab. 
•X - - owner.
- size 
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—  activity j




























































































While the contribution of the schooling level was rising from 23% to 27% 
during the decade, that of age was declining most sharply, from 19% to 13%. 
Wage inequality among schooling levels thus became more pronounced, whereas 
inequality among age levels became less pronounced. This idea of increasing 
returns to schooling and decreasing returns to age or labour market experience 
fits the sociological portrait by Rodrigues and Lopes, who analyse the growing 
dualism of the Portuguese labour market, defined as "une économie et une 
population 'à deux vitesses'" [RODRIGUES and LOPES, 1993: 28]. An older labour 
force, holding specific skills mainly acquired on the workplace and relying on 
seniority rules to be promoted, coexists with a younger labour force, holding 
more general skills and a diploma, and relying on economic modernisation and 
the associated shortage of some skills, as its allies shaping the wage profile at the 
beginning of the career (see RODRIGUES and LOPES [1993: 17,20,28]).
The relevance of the institutional setting is stressed by the growing share of 
inequality associated with the type of collective bargaining mechanism. This was 
brought about by the fact that decentralised bargaining mechanisms reinforced 
during the decade their early 1980s position of high wages relative to the rest of 
the economy. This issue will deserve further comments below.
The sharp increases in within-group inequality that have so far been stressed 
should not disguise the fact that inequality between the groups also increased 
during the decade, for every variable except age. Though both forces contributed 
to rising inequality, the within-group component outweighed the impact of 
changes in inequality between the groups. Decomposition of the changes over 
time in the Theil index provides a more rigorous framework for detecting the 
sources of changing inequality, quantifying the impact of changes in inequality 
within the groups, of changes in the average wage of the groups and of shifts in 
their employment shares. Changing population shares have implications on both 
within-group inequality (depending on the level of inequality within the groups 
whose population changes) and between-group inequality (depending on whether 
the average income of the groups whose population changes is close or far apart 
from the rest of the distribution). Changes in inequality will thus be decomposed 
into [TSAKLOGLOU, 1993: 55-56,67-68,72]:
c
A T = ^ T s A7Ws +
( G \





























































































where kH = j -  represents the average income of group g relative to the overall\
average, and mg stands for the average income of the group. On the right-hand 
side, term 1 measures the impact on T resulting from changes in within-group 
inequality (A7W,), terms 2 and 3 evaluate the impact of changes in the population
Nshares (A-^) while term 4 measures the impact resulting from relative changes in 
the mean income of the groups (Arn^).1" For the weighting variables, the mean 
values of the initial and final periods were considered, following TSAKLOGLOU 
[1993: 69] and m o o k h erjee  and SHORROCKS [1982: 894], The results are 
described in table 5. 10
10 Relative changes because if all the groups' mean income changed by the same proportion, 
term 4 would become zero. Note that it does not evaluate the impact o f changes in the 
relative income o f the groups: even though the decomposed Theil index may be written as 
/ .  / ( njn.tW',mjm), a function of the population shares o f the groups, their internal 
inequality and their mean income relative to the economy, the impact of Am, is considered 
(instead of According to m o o k h erjee  and SHORROCKS [1982: 896], this must be
done to avoid ambiguity in the results, since changes in mgjm reflect changes in both the 
mean income of the groups and their population shares, such that it would not be possible to 




























































































Table 5 -  Decomposition of the change in aggregate inequality, 1983-92
changes in inequality due to
total change 
in inequality




change in mean 
wage of the groups
value x 
100




% value x 
100
%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
worker attributes
skill 4.8 57.0 1.1 13.0 2.5 30.0 8.4 100
schooling 4.6 54.7 2.0 24.4 1.8 20.9 8.4 100
gender 8.4 99.9 -0.1 -1.7 0.1 1.8 8.4 100
age 8.2 97.7 3.4 40.3 -3.2 -38.1 8.4 100
tenure 7.7 91.7 0.4 4.7 0.3 3.6 8.4 100
employer attributes
eco. activity (6-digit) 5.1 59.8 0.1 2.0 3.2 38.2 8.4 100
location 7.1 84.2 -0.7 -8.3 2.0 24.2 8.4 100
ownership structure 7.9 93.9 -1.0 -11.9 1.5 18.0 8.4 100
size (7 categories) 8.7 104.0 -0.8 -10.1 0.5 6.1 8.4 100
type col. barg. mech. 5.8 68.6 0.2 2.6 31.2 8.4 100
Source: Computations based on MESS, Quadros de Pessoal, 1983, 1992.
Notes: Only those partitions of the population that generated groups present both in 1983 and 
1992 were retained for analysis. Otherwise, some groups would not be considered 
when computing the change in rwg , n jN or mg , biasing the computation of the three 
components, and thus of the aggregate change in inequality (changes affecting those 
groups of workers would be discarded, but the weights would still reflect their 
presence, due to the smaller weights attached to the other groups). As an example, 
many firms were present in just one of the two years, such that the partition of the 
population into firms cannot account for the overall change in inequality; also, some 
variables included a category missing, in just one of the years.
Consider first the skill and the schooling levels of the workforce. For either 
variable, all three components revealed a positive contribution to rising earnings 
inequality. First of all, increasing returns to skill and schooling are confirmed by 
data in column 7 -  changes in the mean wage of the groups are associated with 
21% to 30% of the change in inequality. Additional information reveals that the 
wage increases were particularly pronounced for workers with a University 
diploma, for top managers and professionals and for highly skilled personnel. 
Secondly, shifts in the employment structure also operated to increase inequality 
(see column 5). In fact, groups with high internal inequality increased their shares 
in employment -  in particular, professionals, managers and highly skilled 
personnel, those with a University diploma and those with 9 years of education -  
while their average wages (which have an impact on inequality between the 
groups) do not seem to have counteracted the effects that one would expect by 
looking at their within-group inequality. Finally, increasing inequality within 
groups contributed the most to the trend in overall inequality (57% and 55%). 
This tendency was more pronounced among highly skilled personnel and holders 




























































































The upgrading of the quality of the labour force noticed by looking at its skill 
and schooling composition should be stressed (see the rising share of University 
graduates, highly skilled personnel and managers and professionals). Moreover, it 
is interesting to notice the correspondence between groups with rising 
employment shares, rising wages and rising internal inequality. This increase in 
the returns to worker qualifications, in the presence of rising relative supply, 
indicates that sharp demand shifts have favoured qualified workers, with wage 
adjustments bringing about a rise in inequality.
Turning now to the gender variable, the increasing participation of women 
would have had, ceteris paribus, a slight equalising effect on the wage structure 
(column 5, table 5). Nonetheless, it is noticeable that increasing inequality within 
gender groups -  especially women — had the most relevant role in shaping the 
inequality trend, while wage inequality between the sexes remained roughly 
unchanged (compare columns 3 and 7).
The previous results on declining inequality among age levels are confirmed 
by table 5, as changes in the mean wage of age groups would have led, ceteris 
paribus, to a decline in inequality (38% of its actual change, according to the data 
in column 7). However, the rise in within-group inequality was sharp, and 
furthermore young workers, whose employment shares increased, are paid low 
wages relative to the rest of the economy (and thus their lower within-group 
inequality level was not sufficient to generate a negative impact on overall 
inequality -  see the positive contribution reported in column 5).
An interesting result emerges from the analysis of firm attributes. As opposed 
to the situation in the USA, where the displacement of workers from high wage / 
low inequality activities (manufacturing) to lower wage / higher inequality 
activities (services) was found to be a major determinant of rising inequality (see 
for example BLUESTONE [1990]), industrial restructuring was not a major force 
shaping rising inequality in the 1980s in Portugal (see the very low contribution of 
changes in the industrial composition of the working population reported in 
column 5). Instead, wage increases differed markedly across economic activities 
(38% contribution to the increase in inequality, as reported in column 7), 
revealing that different activities exhibited contrasting capacities to adapt to the 
changes taking place. In particular, one finds (for the two-digit level) that wages 
in finance, cultural services and wholesale, chemicals, machinery and wood, 
increased sharply, whereas in more traditional activities -  textiles and 
construction - , but also in public utilities and insurance, wage growth was slow. 
The two-digit activities where wages rose the most can roughly be identified with 
those within which inequality increased the most (the correlation between the 




























































































On the other hand, firms were shifting towards structures usually considered 
more flexible -  smaller units, some relocation out of the Lisbon region; under the 
impact of privatisations, the role of public firms in total employment declined, in 
favour of partnerships. The changes in the size, location and type of ownership of 
firms would have, ceteris paribus, led to a decline in inequality, as illustrated by 
their negative contribution to the change in inequality reported in column 5. 
However, the wage gap between the groups defined by any of these three 
variables widened, in particular the gap between locations and ownership types 
(column 7).
The relevance of the collective bargaining mechanism is confirmed by data in 
table 7. The rising distance between the average wage of types of collective 
bargaining led to an increase in inequality (31% contribution to the rise in total 
inequality). This result is strongly influenced by the situation ad the evolution of 
labour returns in the financial sector. Indeed, less than 10% of the labour force is 
covered by FA or CBA; they are found mainly in the financial sector, where they 
cover virtually all the workers, in transportation and, to a much lower extent, in 
the food, paper or glass industries. The developments of the Portuguese financial 
sector are compatible with rent-sharing type of explanations of its high and rising 
wage levels. Indeed, after 1985 the economy entered an expansion period, 
especially marked in finance, where a deregulation programme opened the sector 
to private initiative, but where regulations persisted concerning the definition of 
interest rates, yielding high profits (that have motivated the entry of national and 
foreign firms into the market). Part of the high profitability of the sector may have 
trickled down to its workforce. The mechanism was probably enhanced by the 
extremely high unionisation rate prevailing in the sector (98-99% in 1985/86 
[CERDEIRA and PAD1LHA, 1990: 40]).
The previous analysis can be organised into a more coherent explanation of 
changes in wage inequality. With a record of high rates of economic growth after 
1985, the Portuguese economy motivated a rising share of its population, 
specially women and youngsters, to join the labour force. The activity rate indeed 
increased during the decade, while unemployment was declining. But this growth 
process was associated with some modernisation of the productive structure, 
illustrated namely by the shift towards more flexible firm structures, and the rise 
in the demand for labour was quite selective. The wages for workers with upper 
skills and schooling levels increased rapidly, despite the increase in their relative 
supply. Moreover, groups with sharp wage increases were themselves 
characterised by rising inequality, which may have reflected the different capacity 




























































































Figure 2 - Changes in employment and changes in nominal wages, 1983-92
skill levels (1) schooling levels
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Source: Computations based on MESS, Quadros de Pessoal, 1983, 1992.
Notes: (1) Skill levels: TMP - top managers and professionals; OMP - other managers and 
professionals; FS - foremen and supervisors; HS - highly skilled personnel; S - 
skilled personnel; SS - semi-skilled personnel; US - unskilled personnel; AP - 
apprentices.
This link between rising demand and rising wages is illustrated in figure 2. A 
sharp increase in employment is reported -  1.7% as the average annual growth 
rate, resulting in a 17% increase from 1983 to 1992" - ,  with a clear positive 
relationship between changing employment and changing wages being observed 
for skill as well as schooling levels. However, workers with a very low schooling 
level (four years of education or less) seem to escape the pattern, having seen 
their wages increase by more than would have been expected considering their 
declining employment share (and indeed, the declining employment level itself). 
The impact of institutions -  minimum wage and trade union action -  may have 
been one of the reasons for such a situation.
Indeed, the interaction between supply and demand is, especially in the labour 
market, mediated by institutions. Indirect evidence can be gathered to comment 
on the impact of trade union action on inequality, in a country where collective 
bargaining is extensively applied and trade-unions claim to follow an inequality- 
reduction strategy (not just equal pay for equal work, but a more compressed 
wage distribution are explicitly demanded -  see SNESUP [1995] for a recent 
example). The analysis by a pe r t a  et. al [1994] highlights the relevance of wage 
drift in the Portuguese economy. While in 1987 wage drift by economic activity 
ranged from a low 0.3% in a clay industry to a high 68% in a wood activity, in 
1991 it ranged from 4.4% to 79%. In an era of rising wage inequality, the use of 1
11 Other data sources confirm this information. Computations based on neves [1993] for the 




























































































wage drift as a mechanism of wage adjustment increased markedly. Furthermore, 
wage increases above the collectively bargained level are a very selective 
mechanism, applied predominantly to groups of workers that have high wages 
and high levels of internal inequality. Such results lend support to the idea that 
wage drift was in fact a powerful tool used by employers to overcome the 
constraints imposed by collective bargaining with equality-oriented trade unions. 
Such may have been one of the main mechanisms through which trade union aims 
and action have to some extent been neutralised.
5. CONCLUSION
Wage inequality among firms accounts for 62% of total inequality -  12% as 
the firm-wide impact on wages, and 50% resulting from the interaction between 
firms and types of workers. Evidence on Portugal therefore corroborates the 
findings by DAVIS and HALT1WANGER [1991] and by g r o sh e n  [1986], according 
to which "between-plant wage dispersion is a large component of overall wage 
dispersion" [DAVIS and HALTIWANGER, 1991: 172].
Nonetheless, support is found for the idea that firms are allowed more 
autonomy in wage setting in the USA, a labour market characterised by a high 
degree of decentralisation, as opposed to the more regulated and centralised 
European systems. Indeed, in Portugal as in most of its European counterparts, 
guidelines for wage increases are set at the national level, certain wage bargaining 
agreements apply industry-wide, contract extension mechanisms are common and 
relatively stringent minimum wage levels are enforced. Still, the results on the 
rlevance of the firm in shaping wage inequality are not as far apart as the 
existence of features such as extension mechanisms in Europe, and their absence 
in the USA, would lead us to foresee. Certain aspects contributing to firm 
autonomy in setting wages have been stressed, some of which are common to 
most European countries, while others are peculiar to Portugal. Employers can 
choose to negotiate individually with a trade union movement that is fragmented 
and furthermore wage drift is widespread. Also, exceptions to the minimum wage 
were common until early 1990s, and the educational and vocational training 
systems have in Portugal a very limited role in shaping workers' career and 
wages. Thus, when comparing the American and the European models, the 
European diversity should not be disregarded. For example, the degree of 
centralisation of the bargaining system varies widely (see the extreme case of 
Sweden), the links between the educational system and the labour world differ 
(see the extreme situation of Germany) and the minimum wage achieves 





























































































During the decade, an upgrading of the quality of the labour force could be 
detected, accompanied by rising returns to worker qualifications, which suggests 
that sharp shifts in the demand for labour favoured workers with upper 
qualifications. These changes were not brought about by shifts in the industrial 
structure, as activities traditionally important in the Portuguese economy, namely 
textiles and retail trade, contributed the most to job creation. Though the 
displacement of workers across sectors was not a major force driving inequality, 
different industries did show different capacities to raise their wage levels, with 
the leading ones revealing rising inequality. It can be claimed that the 
modernisation taking place in certain segments of the economy called for worker 
qualifications that were in short supply, and wages adjusted correspondingly. The 
mediation provided by institutions with explicit concerns for inequality-reduction 
(see trade unions) was unable to offset this rise in inequality. The traits of 
decentralisation that can be found in the Portuguese labour market, namely the 
widespread wage drift, may have been an important force generating this 
outcome. To the extent that rising inequality -  in particular, increasing returns to 
schooling and skill — has been signalling the lack of an adequate labour force to 
promote economic change, investment in schooling and vocational training 





























































































APPENDIX A -  DATA USED
The data set
The data set gathered by the Ministry of Employment and Social Security 
( m e s s ) is based on a questionnaire that every establishment with wage earners is, 
since 1982, legally obliged to fill in, matching data on the firm, the establishment 
and each of the workers.12 By design, public administration and domestic work 
are not covered by the database (state-owned companies are) and in practice 
neither is agriculture. For the remaining sectors, Quadros de Pessoal (QP) is a 
very reliable source of information, being in fact a census of firms, 
establishments, and their workers. For manufacturing, a thorough evaluation of 
the coverage of QP can be made, since a Census of manufacturing is available, 
gathered by a different source. Comparison of both data sets reveals that QP 
covers more workers than the census itself, despite the fact that the census 
includes very small firms that are not a part of the population covered by QP 
(firms with no wage earners).
Sampling
Agriculture, fishery and mining, as well as public administration and 
international organisations were excluded from the analysis, since these sectors 
are not adequately covered by the inquiry (they either have a very low share of 
wage earners in total employment, or they are among the activities explicitly 
excluded from the obligation to answer the questionnaire); residual categories 
such as other manufacturing activities were also dropped (representing 0.5% of 
the workers in the database in 1992). Electricity, gas and steam and 
communications were excluded from the analysis (in 1992, these sectors 
represented 2.8% of the workers), due to the very unrepresentative nature of the 
sample that had been drawn.13
The years of 1983, 1986, 1989 and 1992 were selected for analysis, given that 
they span over a decade, allowing for the detection and explanation of inequality
12 Workers engaged in the firm during the whole or part of the last week of March, including 
those on temporary leave (for example, maternity leave or strike).
13 These sectors were made up of one or two large firms (with several thousands of workers) 
and a reduced number of small firms (with fewer than 50 employees); the random sample 
picked precisely one or two of the latter type of firms, thus generating a very distorted image 
of the activity. This procedure of eliminating economic activities for which a small number of 
observations is available in the sample is found in other works (see namely GREGG and 
MACHIN [1994:110], who have eliminated 15 3-digit activities).
The alternative of arbitrarily picking the monopoly or one of the oligopoly firms in the 
industry would render it unfeasible to report the results by economic activity, as 
confidentiality constraints would be violated for those firms; furthermore, the dimension of 
our already-hard-to-manage sample would increase by approximately 15% and a random 





























































































patterns, while the manageability of the database and the identification of stylised 
facts would be enhanced by omitting the details of a year-to-year analysis. For the 
first year under analysis, a 20% random sample of firms, stratified according to 
economic activity (defined at the 2-digit level) was drawn. For subsequent years, 
firms previously sampled were followed, and new firms, that had meanwhile 
joined the database, were sampled according to the principle just described. 
Sampling firms according to this procedure enables us to take into account firm 
birth and death which, as reported by MATA [1993], MATA and PORTUGAL [1994] 
and by b r a n d a o  a l v e s  and m a d r u g a  [1993], achieves high levels in the 
Portuguese economy.14
Only full-time wage earners were retained for analysis (part-timers represent a 
small share of the database, 10% of the wage earners in 1992). Full timers are 
defined in the database according to the duration of work set by collective 
bargaining, which generally results in working at least 120 to 140 hours a month, 
depending on the economic activity. The resulting sample sizes are described in 
the table below.
Table A l -  Sample sizes
1983 1986 1989 1992
number o f workers 253 157 247 536 291 379 295 050
number of firms 15 180 16138 21 000 24 567
The sample reproduces accurately not just the average firm size of each 
economic activity, but also its firm size structure (number of firms in each size 
bracket). Ex-post checks on the distribution of the sample according to worker 
characteristics also confirmed its representativeness. Alternative sampling 
procedures were considered, but they were judged to be less appropriate. 
Namely, sampling proportional to firm size would drive us away from the 
situation of an economy essentially made up of small firms, requiring the 
introduction of additional assumptions (those embodied in a weighting scheme) 
to enable the representativeness of the sample to be claimed. The procedure was 
considered superfluous, given that no cost is involved in gathering data about 
small firms, as opposed to the major constraint usually faced by sample designers. 
Furthermore, given the emphasis to be placed on the demand side of the market, it 
was assessed to be important to preserve the market structure/degree of 
concentration of the sectors.
14 According to b r a n d a o  a l v e s  and m a d r u g a  [1993: 29-30, table 4], 31% of the 
establishments created in 1982 were out of business one year later (55% if a three-year 
period is considered); MATA and PORTUGAL [1994: 228] report that 22% of the firms created 
in 1983 were out o f business a year later, and only half o f the initial ones survived for four 
years. MATA [1992: 121-122] makes a good case for dismissing the possibility o f these facts 




























































































APPENDIX B -  CONCEPT OF EARNINGS
, , , j i bw + ts + rs + isAverage hourly earnings were computed as nw -------- —-------. all the right
hand side variables referring to monthly reported figures: bw stands for base- 
wage, ts is the payment indexed to tenure, rs are regularly paid subsidies, is are 
irregular subsidies and nh is the normal duration of work, as defined in the 
collective agreement or by firm regulations. Gross earnings are considered, before 
the deduction of any taxes or Social Security contributions, and no other labour 
costs are included. Cash benefits, as well as benefits in kind paid regularly, are 
reported. Irregularly paid subsidies, such as Christmas or holiday pay, are likely 
not to be reported, since only the fraction actually paid in March is registered.
Hourly rewards are meant to control for the different durations of the working 
day. The fact that most wage bargaining agreements specify the normal duration 
of work, together with the monthly wage, strengthens this choice. Comparable 
hours of work should be analysed, and therefore overtime pay and work were not 
taken into consideration.
APPENDIX C -  VARIABLES USED TO DECOMPOSE INEQUALITY AND 
GROUPS DEFINED
- Skill, defined according to the Portuguese Classification of Skills: top managers 
and professionals; other managers and professionals; foremen and supervisors; 
highly skilled personnel; skilled personnel; semi-skilled personnel; unskilled 
personnel; apprentices.
- Schooling: primary school or less (<= 4 yrs.); 6 yrs.; 9 yrs.; 11-12 yrs.; 
university (2 types of bachelor diplomas; university graduation).
- Gender
- Age, defined as actual years.
- Tenure, defined as actual years.
- Occupation: defined according to the 5-digit Portuguese Classification of 
Occupations, yielding 1207 different occupations in the sample.
- The firm
- The establishment
- Type o f collective bargaining mechanism: collective bargaining contract; 
collective bargaining agreement; firm agreement; Government mandatory 
regime.
- Economic activity: defined according to the 6-digit Portuguese Classification of 
Economic Activities, yielding 443 activities; the 2-digit classification yields 20 
activities.
- Location, defined as one of the 18 distritos of mainland Portugal.
- Ownership structure: public company; sole proprietorship; partnership; joint- 
stock company.
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